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INTRODUCTION
The decision of the US Court of Appeals for theFourth Circuit in El-Masri v United States, March 2,2007, excited little press attention in the UK. This
is peculiar given the earlier coverage of the case in the
British press, and Lord Steyn’s view (expressed in The
Guardian, April 22, 2006) that extraordinary rendition is a
“fancy phrase for kidnapping” in serious violation of
international law.
In El-Masri the US Federal Courts have been squarely
confronted by a complaint asserting constitutional (in UK
terms Human Rights) abuses and torts against the US
Government. In essence a German national alleged that he
was kidnapped from Macedonia in 2003, transported to
Afghanistan, detained and tortured by the servants or
agents of the Central Intelligence Agency for about ﬁve
months before being released in Albania. El-Masri (“EM”)
sued the CIA for compensation. However, the US
Executive intervened, asserted “state secret privilege”
(“SSP”) and applied for dismissal of EM’s claim without
either pleaded defence, disclosure or trial – curious
outcome you may think in “the land of the brave and home
of the free.” The Federal District Court acceded to that
application. The Fourth Circuit has afﬁrmed the dismissal
of EM’s claim on the grounds of SSP.
In this article I propose to analyse the El-Masri approach
to SSP, scrutinise the jurisprudence underlying it, subject it
to a comparative analysis against the English court’s
approach to public interest immunity (“PII”) and consider
what its potential impact on claims brought by the alleged
victims of extra-ordinary rendition might be in English
courts.
THE FACTS OF EL-MASRI
On December 6, 2005 EM commenced civil
proceedings in the US Federal Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia against the director of the CIA and 10
un-named CIA agents. He advanced three causes of action:
• That the CIA had exerted federal power against him in
breach of the restraints of the Fifth Amendment to the
US Constitution, which provides that “no person
shall… be deprived of… liberty… without due
process of law”.
• That he had been arbitrarily detained by the CIA,
contrary to international law, which constituted an
actionable tort by virtue of the Aliens Tort Statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1350, a federal law that states, in relevant
part: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”
• In tortious violation of international law (Art 3 of the
Geneva Convention (III) 1949, to which the US is a
signatory, he had been subjected to cruel, degrading or
inhuman treatment by the CIA, its servants or agents.
EM asserted that he would at trial rely on at least three
evidentiary matters:
• his own personal knowledge and experience of what
had happened to him;
• the press coverage and journalistic investigations into
his case and also “similar” rendition cases;
• the results of the European Commission’s
investigations into his and similar cases.
STATE SECRET PRIVILEGE (“SSP”)
The US Government raised “state secret privilege”,
applied for “dismissal” of El-Masri’s claim and ﬁled
evidence in support of that application. The Fourth Circuit
summarised the evidence thus (the underlining is mine):
“The CIA… submitted two sworn declarations … in support
of the state secrets privilege claim. The first… was
unclassified, and explained in general terms the reasons for
the… assertion of privilege. The other… was classified; it
detailed the information that the United States sought to
protect, explained why further court proceedings would
unreasonably risk that information’s disclosure, and spelled





A report on the ﬁrst civil tort claim for “extraordinary rendition” to
reach the US courts.
THE LEGAL ISSUES
El-Masri purports to apply the legal exposition of SSP
said to be derived from US v Reynolds (1953) 345 US 1.
Accordingly, the Circuit stated the issue thus:
“To summarize, our analysis of the executive’s interposition of
the state secrets privilege is governed primarily by two
standards. First, evidence is privileged pursuant to the state
secrets doctrine if, under all the circumstances of the case, there
is a reasonable danger that its disclosure will expose military…
or intelligence matters which, in the interest of national
security, should not be divulged…. Second, a proceeding in
which the state secrets privilege is successfully interposed must
be dismissed if the circumstances make clear that privileged
information will be so central to the litigation that any attempt
to proceed will threaten that information’s disclosure.”
Whether that is the “correct” formulation of the true
legal issue engaged either in accordance with the Reynolds
test or otherwise is seriously open to debate. (In fairness to
the Fourth Circuit, the court carefully recorded that its
approach to the formulation of the issue and the applicable
law was not seriously challenged by El-Masri and that the
controversy was the application of those principles to the
facts. It will be contended in this article that the Fourth
Circuit’s error was somewhat more fundamental and that it
has misdirected itself). What is perhaps noteworthy is the
absence in the Fourth Circuit’s identiﬁcation of the relevant
competing interests, let alone its failure to perform a
“weighing and balancing” of the competing interests.
El-Masri does not undertake a balancing exercise between:
1. The public interest in the administration of justice;
2. The public interest in the maintenance of national
security;
3. The claimant’s interest in having access to the court
and a fair determination of alleged Governmental
violations of his civil rights;
4. The court’s constitutional interest in operating as a
sufﬁcient “check and balance” on abuse of executive
power;
5. The international public law dimension to allegations
that the US Government has willfully and deliberately
violated its treaty obligations;
6. The executive’s constitutional interest in freedom to
execute and discharge its obligations to protect and
defend the nation against its enemies, be they foreign
or domestic.
It is strongly arguable that the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning
is thereby fundamentally ﬂawed on basic tenets of
internationally recognized administrative law: it has failed to
identify all of the relevant factors and balance them in the
exercise of what was, in truth, the exercise of a judicial
discretion. It can be said with some force that the Fourth
Circuit’s decision proceeds on the erroneous footing that the
mechanistic operation of the so called Reynolds test, produces
the correct analytical result. It will be argued below that this
was jurisprudentially lazy and ultimately fallacious.
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DECISION
The gravamen of the court’s decision is:
“The controlling inquiry is not whether the general subject
matter of an action can be described without resort to state
secrets. Rather, we must ascertain whether an action can be
litigated without threatening the disclosure of such state
secrets. Thus, for purposes of the state secrets analysis, the
‘central facts’ and ‘very subject matter’ of an action are those
facts that are essential to prosecuting the action or defending
against it. El-Masri is therefore incorrect in contending that
the central facts of this proceeding are his allegations that he
was detained and interrogated under abusive conditions, or
that the CIA conducted the rendition program that has been
acknowledged by United States officials… If El-Masri’s civil
action were to proceed, the facts central to its resolution would
be the roles, if any, that the defendants played in the events he
alleges. To establish a prima facie case, he would be obliged to
produce admissible evidence not only that he was detained and
interrogated, but that the defendants were involved in his
detention and interrogation in a manner that renders them
personally liable to him. Such a showing could be made only
with evidence that exposes how the CIA organizes, staffs, and
supervises its most sensitive intelligence operations.”
THE JURISPRUDENCE
No government exists in a vacuum. If there are those
who govern there are those who are governed. In a
democracy, the relationship between these two estates is
regulated by the power of the one to exert control over the
other. The triple advantages of cooperation, coordination
and cohesion lend themselves to the consensual agreement
of the population to submit to governance by a selected few.
But the concentration of such control in the hands of the
few brings with it the risk that the people might become
enslaved to the rule of that minority. To prevent such
“tyranny” the modern democratic model recognises and by
one mechanism or another enshrines the importance of the
constitutional concept of the “separation of powers.” This
is because humanity’s experience has tended to
demonstrate that “all power tends to corrupt and absolute
power tends to corrupt absolutely”. Thus, for the
protection of society, no one body is permitted to enjoy the
unrestrained freedom to create and vest power, determine
how to best wield that power and decide whether it has
exceeded its powers. For if the people “elect” such a body
to possess all these powers, nothing prevents such a body
from thereafter abolishing the people’s right to remove it
and doing at its whim what it pleases.
Traditionally the “powers” are shared out surrendering
“efﬁciency” to “safety.” This entails the division of
government into discrete bodies: the executive, the
legislature and the judiciary. Conceptually, the executive18
Amicus Curiae Issue 70 Summer 2007
stands seized and able to exercise all those powers the law
grants to it. By the same token, the legislature is the
originator of those powers and possesses the right to
bestow or remove them. The judiciary determines what
powers have been granted, withheld or abused. But as any
law student will tell you, in truth the functions of each limb
are not so neatly compartmentalised. For example, the
executive must in times of urgency or crisis have the power
“effectively” to legislate –in the USA by Presidential
Executive Order and in the UK by the exercise of
prerogative power. The judiciary in a common law
jurisdiction can “adjust” its own case law and develop its
doctrines to meet the needs of a modern dynamic society
and thereby “create” its own powers.
But the conceptual purpose of each of these three limbs
of government is that between them none is ultimately
supreme over the other. In other words within this
triumvirate, each constituent possesses sufﬁcient authority
to suppress, prevent or expose an abuse of power by one of
the other components. It is thus an uneasy balance of
power between the three.
A CRITIQUE OF EL-MASRI
In the author’s opinion the Fourth Circuit in El-Masri
misstated, misunderstood and misapplied the Supreme
Court’s ratio in Reynolds. What is quite terrifying is that the
El-Masri decision casually collapses the rule of law, potentially
introduces “blanket immunity” for the executive, and
thereby puts state-sponsored extraordinary rendition
beyond judicial scrutiny. The decision is the subject of ﬁerce
academic debate in the US – see for example
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/03/dangerous-
discretion-state-secrets-and.php
The Fourth Circuit’s error is as basic as it is
fundamental. It represents not merely a legal
misdirection but a constitutional catastrophe. The Fourth
Circuit was bound by section 2 of Article III of the US
Constitution to assert full judicial authority in all matters
of controversy involving the United States and
concerning foreign states, citizens or subjects. To hold
that the US Government’s talismanic invocation of SSP
deprives the foreign citizen of a trial of his allegation that
his internationally recognised human rights have been
grossly violated by the US Government, is nothing short
of an alienation by the court of its own constitutional
obligations. The Fourth Circuit has, with respect,
forgotten its role as a judicial “check and balance” on the
executive’s abuse of powers. Further, the Fourth Circuit
ignores the fact that the US Supreme Court has
consistently rejected the executive’s claims to enjoy an
immunity from judicial scrutiny for its actions in waging
a “war on terror” (see Rasul v Bush, June 28, 2004 and
Hamdan v Rumsfeld, June 29, 2006).
The reasoning of the Fourth Circuit does not turn upon
EM’s status as a foreign national. It would apply to a US
citizen. Prior to the Human Rights Act 1998, the English
courts recognised that it was of the gravest constitutional
signiﬁcance to hold that the executive was never to be
assured that it was beyond the reach of the court’s powers
(see R v Secretary of State Exp Factortame and the speech of
Lord Templeman, and also Lord Steyn’s Attlee Lecture of
April 11, 2006 at www.attlee.org.uk/Transcript-Steyn.doc).
Axiomatically, there can be no government of the people,
by the people, for the people if citizens cannot in their own
courts challenge the executive’s abuses. For these purposes
both the national and non-national plaintiff stands in the
same shoes.
The El-Masri decision raises the “tension” between the
executive’s need to rule, defend the nation and protect its
national security interests. Under UK law the executive
possess similar, if not arguably greater, powers by virtue of
the prerogative powers. Be that as it may, the Fourth Circuit
has unquestionably unanchored the SSP doctrine from its
“evidentiary” roots and escalated it to a substantive rule
that under certain circumstances the executive enjoys
“immunity from suit.” The elevation of SSP into
“immunity” cannot on that basis be jurisprudentially
justiﬁed. The constitutional signiﬁcance of the separation of
powers has been ignored by the El-Masri decision. The
court has failed to grapple with the true balance to be
struck between the competing principles and fallen into
serious error because it has profoundly misunderstood the
ratio of Totten v United States (1875) 92 US 105.
Totten involved a suit upon a secret espionage contract.
The spy sued the US government. The Supreme Court
held that a suit by the spy against the state for his reward
pursuant to a “conﬁdential” agreement would in itself
disclose the state secret, ie the subject matter of the
contract. On those grounds the claim was dismissed
without trial. But Totten turned upon the
“conﬁdentiality” of the evidence the spy proposed to
adduce. In modern terms the state was, on grounds of
conﬁdentiality, entitled to restrain the spy’s disclosure of
the contract. He had freely entered into such an
arrangement with the state. It would be inherent in the
spy’s claim for reward that he had performed the services
under the contract and any investigation of that would
disclose the secret. On analysis Totten declares SSP to be
merely an evidential rule that excuses the state from
adducing or having adduced before the court its own
conﬁdential secrets (indeed President Bush has tacitly
acknowledged the “evidential” foundation of SSP in his
own Executive Order 13233). In short the state is
entitled to control the use made by those in whom it
conﬁdes of its own secrets. It is the voluntary, intimate
relationship and impressed “conﬁdentiality” existing
between the spy and the state that justiﬁed and
analytically underpinned the rationale of Totten.
In Reynolds the widows of three civilian observers killed
in the 1948 crash of a B-29 bomber sued the state for
negligence. The purpose of the ﬂight had been to test secret 19
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military electronic equipment. The widows applied for
disclosure of the accident reports into the crash. The state
raised SSP as an objection to the disclosure request. The
Supreme Court upheld the state’s claim to SSP. Chief
Justice Vinson gave the court’s decision and repeatedly
referred to SSP as an “evidentiary privilege”. So the widows
did not at that stage get to see the accident reports, which
many years later were de-classiﬁed, revealed to the victims’
offspring, and disclosed gross negligence by the USAF.
The point that the Fourth Circuit overlooks is that even
in Reynolds the court did not dismiss the tort claim. It simply
held that the plaintiffs could not acquire materials from the
government when the court was satisﬁed that disclosure by
the government of the same was contrary to the national
interest. Whilst the “deference” the Reynolds court gave to
the executive itself requires judicial reconsideration, the
court did not grant the executive immunity from suit.
The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning thus on its own premises
manifestly defective. It is indeed one thing to say that the
defendant is “privileged” from disclosing documents or
adducing evidence. There is nothing remarkable in holding
SSP excuses the state from such a demand. But it is quite
another to hold that the claimant is to be barred from
adducing his own knowledge and evidence. Neither
Reynolds nor Totten constitute authority for such a
proposition. Yet El-Masri effectively holds to the contrary.
In doing so the Circuit has emasculated the civil rights
granted to him by Congress and abrogated his concomitant
constitutional right to “due process”.
Elementarily, the claimant must prove his case. That
burden offends no concept of adversarial justice. SSP (or in
English terms PII) might well hamper him and perhaps
result in the practical consequence that he will be unable to
discharge the burden of proof. But it is going too far to
hold that the SSP doctrine justiﬁes the dismissal of his case
without a trial. It is deeply troubling for the judiciary to
hold that the state can assert “conﬁdence and secrecy”
against ex hypothesi the personal knowledge of an unlawfully
detained and tortured claimant. Indeed, it is quite absurd.
For the result of such reasoning is that the state can - on
grounds of national security – abduct, detain and torture
whomsoever it pleases without any legal consequence.
Once seen in that light the rationale of El-Masri is
constitutionally and logically barren.
The consequence of the court’s ruling is that the judiciary
is stripped of its power to protect the citizen against the
unlawful excesses of the executive. Such a holding turns any
constitutional theory of the separation of powers on its
head. It starkly amounts to the proposition that accused of
torture and human rights violations, the executive can reply
“we decline to answer these allegations” because if we did
so, we would risk national security. Further the court ought
not to hear the claim at all. Thus, it is argued in El-Masri that
the mere assertion of the executive’s SSP amounts to a
legitimate ground for the dismissal of the victim’s claim on
the grounds that the executive cannot “defend” itself or
have a fair trial because it chooses not to engage in the
dispute on grounds of national security.
It is submitted that El-Masri is quite astonishing in its
depraved constitutional theory. What “national security”
can there be in a nation when the federal judiciary
effectively holds allegations that the executive unlawfully
abducts, detains and tortures people are beyond the
purview of the court? For carried to its logical extreme, the
reasoning in El-Masri will mean that the state can have
habeas corpus proceedings dismissed on the grounds of
national security. If that reductio nil absurdum is not a classic
demonstration of the collapse of the rule of law, it is
difﬁcult to know what is.
Where the legislature in a nation enacts laws protecting
people be they citizens or foreign nationals from “cruel or
inhuman and degrading treatment” the rule of law
demands that the executive obey those threshold
standards. The oath of Federal Ofﬁce in the US for its
judges and its executive (5 USCS § 3331) consists of the
words “ … I will support and defend the Constitution of
the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic;
that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same…”
No provision of the US Constitution grants the executive
immunity from suit for civil torts. There is by the same
token no provision in the US Constitution authorising an
executive claim to SSP. It is a judicially “created” rule and a
creature of a common law heritage. A doctrine that
prevents a victim of alleged human rights violations at the
hands of the executive from litigating about that abuse in
court, is anathema to any basic standard of justice. The
court that propounds such a rule divorces itself from reality,
invites ridicule and demolishes any claim it might have to
either domestic or international respect.
Even if a claimant’s own evidence engaged a “secrecy
issue,” there is no reason why that evidence can not be
heard in camera and the material sealed. If need be the
court can order a bench trial. In other words it is not
beyond the wit of the judiciary to create and implement
sufﬁcient safeguards to balance “national security” against
the citizen’s right to justice. To dismiss outright a claim for
human rights violations against the executive does not
merely risk, but invites tyranny. For where can the citizen
complain but to the courts?
THE UK POSITION AND PII
It is probably only a matter of time before a suit is
brought in the UK accusing the UK Government of being
an accomplice or conspirator in extraordinary rendition.
Interesting domestic tort law issues would thereby engage.
But the executive’s power to assert PII would not authorise
the court to dismiss such a claim. To English eyes it is an
absurd notion that the executive could invoke “national
security” to prevent the trial of a prima facie legitimate claim
against the executive. It might well be able to resist
disclosure and perhaps secure a trial in private. But not in
its wildest dreams could the UK executive hope to achieve
the outcome in El-Masri.
During the Cold War, it was famously said in the USA
that the Soviet Union was “the evil empire.” That was
justiﬁable on the basis that the USSR had a written
constitution with “rights” enshrined for its citizens. Those
rights were frequently violated by the state and the state
controlled courts would not protect the victimised citizen.
Naturally we all assume it could not happen in the West?
The “secret police” could not possibly abduct persons
from the streets, transport and torture them in the name
of national security? Surely, the courts would not stand idle
and permit the same? There are “constitutional
protections”, are there not? It is unthinkable that the court
would not step in? If some stranger did that to you, there
would be a lawsuit. It is just obvious. So why not with the
government and its servants and agents? No? Well,
welcome to the Western World post El-Masri.
It now appears that in a so-called democracy the state
can do what it likes to whomsoever it chooses. It can
exercise any arbitrary caprice in its deﬁance of human
rights. It can abduct, detain and torture because it is held
judicially unanswerable for its actions. In the author’s view,
this is a kind of judicially permitted state-sanctioned
terrorism. For El Masri means that the mere plea of
“national security” takes on the status of the Monopoly™
“get out of jail free card.” The state becomes immune from
the legal consequences of its actions.
El Masri eviscerates civil rights. It brutally propounds the
welfare of the state over the core rights of the individual. If
the El Masri decision is not a legal laughing stock, then – I
confess – I do not know what is. How in a democracy can
it be that the state “excuses” itself from judicial
investigation? How can the leaders of a state morally
condemn other nations for practising that which they
themselves do under the veil of secrecy?
Axiomatically, there is a difﬁcult balance to be struck
between the rival interests. National security is vital. It is
no small matter. But equally, it does not exist in a vacuum.
It is pointless during the “defence” of democracy to start
to erode the very elements of that democracy. For without
urgent judicial introspection, it will not be long before the
very freedoms we seek to defend against foreign
“terrorists” will become lost in the fray.
CONCLUSION
I hope that after this analysis you ﬁnd the El Masri decision
both frightening and abhorrent. If you believe that all and
any steps are justiﬁable in the “war on terrorism”, you fail to
appreciate how brittle your own “liberties” become. As you
take away the rights of others, be assured you reduce your
own moral claim to your own freedoms. It will, in the end,
become a vicious circle and downward spiral.
But there is hope of a reversal because in May 2007 the
American Civil Liberties Union petitioned the US Supreme
Court for certiorari in relation to the Circuit’s decision in El-
Masri. Having regard to the constitutional gravity of the
matter, I presume that certiorari will be forthcoming. The
court will probably consider that matter early next term and
a ruling given sometime in 2008/09 depending on the
docket. For the reasons I have given above, left unchallenged
the Circuit’s reasoning represents a severe “attack” on
modern US constitutional theory. In one sense the easy
juridical answer is to simply reverse and remand El-Masri on
the narrow ground that it fails to properly apply Reynolds. Such
a solution might possess some attraction for a ‘politically’
divided court and could prove more appealing than
embarking upon a root and branch reconsideration of the
underlying principles articulated in Reynolds. For
undoubtedly, El-Masri crystallises the constitutional tension
between the executive’s ability to aggressively defend the
nation on the one hand and the court’s duty to vindicate the
rights of the innocent victim caught up in the maelstrom of
the executive’s ‘war on terror’ on the other. If the current
Supreme Court retrace the jurisprudence underlying SSP,
the philosophical and intellectual schisms within it will open
up and ensure a titanic clash of legal ideology. This is exactly
what happened on June 25, 2007 when the Supreme Court
decided Morse v Frederick, a case which considered whether a
state school principal infringed a student’s “freedom of
speech” by punishing him for unfurling a banner promoting
drug use at an event attended by the school and whether, if
there was a freedom violation, the school was nevertheless
privileged against liability. A 5 to 4 majority held that there
was no First Amendment violation whereas the minority held
there that there was. The court held 8 to 1 that the school
was privileged against liability. This is a demonstration that
whilst the ultimate solution is evident, the justices disagree
about the legal pathways that lead to it.
Similar debate can be expected in El-Masri. Ironically,
the “conservative” elements who historically favour the
theory of an “unchanging” constitution will strive to avoid
judicial interventionism and will thereby either have to
uphold and apply Reynolds or destroy SSP in favour of
legislative control. Conversely, the “liberals” favouring a
“modern” constitution will ﬁnd Reynolds unsatisfactory and
struggle to “replace” it with a sound doctrine hardy
enough to fairly balance the relevant competing interests
whilst preserving the safeguards against the executive. One
can therefore reasonably predict that the problem El-Masri
presents is likely to fashion unexpected alliances between
the justices when the Supreme Court’s renders its decision.
But, only when the ﬁnal guardians of the US Constitution
determine the role of SSP in the accountability of the
executive for alleged civil tort and human rights violations,
shall we learn whether the crucial nine American jurists do
indeed, in the words of the Declaration of Independence,
“hold these truths to be self evident…” .
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